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Abstract 
The biomedicalization process and the rise of genetics that have occurred in the last 
decades involve political issues concerning subjects in biomedicine who are in a position to 
act and make choices. My work examines these issues through a study of the process by 
which neonatal screening for the genetic disease of cystic fibrosis was set up in France. 
Making use of the Foucauldian notion of government, which implies power relations among 
entities recognized as subjects of action, I examine how different agents (or groups) came to 
form either governing or governable entities within this health policy, and by what means 
government in this area is exercised. The study positions relations between governors and the 
governed in the dynamic specific to them, showing that screening for cystic fibrosis is to a 
large degree a political technique for governing self and others based on a biomedical 
technique. Two types of subjects (a professional association and a patients‟ association) are 
seen to be constituted in different ways and endowed with more or less extensive power. 
More generally, the study raises the question of the form of the political, through the example 
of genetic screening. 
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Introduction 
The health policies that began to emerge in northern countries in the eighteenth 
century had farther-reaching objectives than before: it was no longer a matter of merely 
eliminating disease but also preventing it (Foucault, 1994). On a practical level, this shift led 
to developing and using statistics about populations and diseases, and to a series of 
interventions affecting lifestyles and living conditions, as well as to the practice of screening a 
priori normal populations. With the deployment of surveillance medicine in the second half of 
the twentieth century, the amount of screening increased substantially (Armstrong, 1995). 
This medicalization movement, whereby the field of medical intervention, its authority and 
practices were greatly extended, has more recently evolved into a process of 
biomedicalization strongly marked by integration of new scientific technology (Clarke, 
Mamo, Fisman, Shim, & Fosket, 2003). In this context, the genetic approach has worked to 
outline a new form of knowledge that has modified theories, discourses, and biomedical 
objects. Proponents of this approach sometimes go so far as to claim that the truth of a human 
being is inscribed in his or her genes,
i
 though the increasingly apparent limitations of this kind 
of “genetics is all” understanding, underestimating as it does the complexity of living beings, 
seem now to be undermining this viewpoint (Fox Keller, 2000). Neonatal genetic screening is 
part of the biomedicalization process and as such has been developing rapidly. This should 
not surprise us given that the family-child complex was the first target of medical jurisdiction 
and that infants have long been a preferred focus of health policies (Foucault, 1994). While in 
the United States the number of diseases screened for at birth varies by state, some states test 
for up to 43 diseases, most of genetic origin, using a new technique called tandem mass 
spectrometry (ACMG, 2005). In France five diseases are tested for at birth, including cystic 
fibrosis [mucoviscidose in French] since January 2002 when the country opted to generalize 




There are two fundamental characteristics of neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis. 
First, in the absence of a cure for the disease, screening for it has given rise to a debate in the 
biomedical arena (Grosse, Boyle, Botkin, Comeau, Kharrazi, Rosenfeld et al., 2004), as there 
are differentiated evaluations of the relation between advantages (namely, proper nutrition for 
patients and an end to diagnostic confusion) and disadvantages (namely, risk of cross-
contamination and false positives). The existence of this debate explains in part why neonatal 
screening for the disease is not more widespread. Until recently, it was limited to France, 
nearly all of Australia and New Zealand, certain regions of the United States and Great 
Britain.
iii
 Second, it is the first screening program in France to mobilize molecular biology 
instruments at a mass scale. France‟s cystic fibrosis screening program involves a complex 
sequence of procedures: briefly, first, the level in the blood of the protein immunoreactive 
trypsin is tested; if the test is positive DNA mutation is looked for; the definitive diagnosis is 
then made on the basis of chloride level in sweat. Because it makes use of both classic 
techniques (the sweat test has been used since the 1950s) and recent ones (the mutations 
associated with cystic fibrosis were first tested for in the 1990s) that are part of different 
socio-historical stages of the disease (Kerr, 2005), neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis is 
exemplary of certain current developments in biomedicine, where DNA study is becoming 
increasingly ordinary (Clarke, Mamo, Fisman, Shim, & Fosket, 2003).  
Underlining the theoretical contribution of Georges Canguilhem‟s work, Foucault 
(1994) explained that when geneticists and biologists look for mutations, they make 
themselves knowing subjects while taking life itself as their object. Human beings become 
rational subjects who can modify themselves as living beings
iv
 and establish a circuit between 
subject and object. In addition to the philosophical aspects of this, the idea of a balance 
between subject and object echoes certain political questions that may be formulated as 
follows: What “subject” is in a position to make choices? Who is the “object” of public 
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policies? The position of acting subjects in biomedicine has been the focus of several studies 
in the social sciences, which purport to show the limitations of their position or, on the 
contrary stress their influence. Some researchers have emphasized the determinism effect 
produced by “geneticization” (Lippman, 1992), the passivity and fatalism inherent in the idea 
that the future is inescapably inscribed in our genes (Nelkin, 1996; Senior, Marteau, & Peters, 
1999). More recently, other researchers have claimed that patient collectives are full-fledged 
actors in genetic research (Rabeharisoa & Callon, 1999). Still others, while rejecting the idea 
of any sharp distinction between power and subjectivity, have suggested that what we are 
seeing is a new form of subjectivation, expressed in matters of genetic testing by the notions 
of responsibility, choice, and wishes (Lemke, 2004; Novas & Rose, 2000; Rose, 2001). At a 
more general level, the vision of people as passive in the face of technology has been replaced 
in the last few years by a more dynamic image, wherein their responses to new technology 
range from acceptance to rejection or indifference (Lock & Kaufert, 1998). Lastly, and more 
broadly than in biomedicine, study of the “gouvernement des corps” (government of bodies) 
has allowed for analyzing the type of subject produced by policies touching on life or the 
living being, in a framework defined not only by the law but also and to an equal degree by 
norms and values (Fassin & Memmi, 2004). The present study takes up the notion of 
government to see what light it sheds on the new genetics-related policies.  
To preclude all misunderstanding, it should be specified that Foucault (1994) defined 
his notion of “government” as the set of more or less conscious and calculated modes of 
action that act on other individuals‟ action possibilities. In this sense, government refers not 
only to political structures and management by the state, but to a way of structuring others‟ 
eventual field of action. It implies a power relation, exercised on another who is recognized 
and maintained as a subject of action, and it includes strategies and instruments for governing 
others. Analyzing an instance of government therefore presupposes studying types of 
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governing agents and governed agents, the way the entity to be governed is conceived, the 
techniques used to govern, and the ends sought (Dean, 1999). These aspects are of course 
interrelated because the way of acting and shaping behavior fashions the types of subject, and 
subjects are themselves in a position to condition these techniques.  
I am concerned in this study with the influence of genetics on the way we conduct our 
lives - i.e., how we conduct ourselves and how others influence our conduct - by looking at 
the history and practices of neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis in France. Specifically, I 
examine how different agents become governing or governable individuals (or groups) and by 
what means and instruments government is exercised. The first part of this article presents the 
study and the methodology used. The second part shows the subtle power relations between 
professionals and non-professionals in the history of neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis in 
France: the influence of professionals is notable and there has been a generally fragmented 
conception of practices. In the third part I present and analyze one of the major arguments that 
worked in favor of choosing neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis in France, showing that 
screening was in part conceived as a tool for governing patients in time and space. While I am 
fully aware how likely it is for political and scientific issues to be interrelated, in this text I 
concentrate on the political side of the problem; I do not look into the truth regimes cited in 
scientific and medical arguments either in favor of cystic fibrosis screening or against it, as 
this would extend beyond the scope of this article. 
 
Presentation of the study 
To answer the questions raised above, I conducted a qualitative study from 2002 to 
2004 that further developed an earlier study in which I retraced the history and issues 
involved in setting up a regional cystic fibrosis screening program in Brittany in the late 
1980s. This earlier study brought to light the fact that the arguments that had been used by 
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pediatricians and biologists worked to legitimate screening in this region and had wider-
ranging effects, resonating with action outside the biomedical sector proper, in a section of the 
Breton population (anonymous reference for referees). On the basis of this first study I was 
also able to begin identifying the national officials involved in cystic fibrosis screening in 
France and get a sense of their positions on the screening program. For the national-level 
section of the project, I conducted 25 semi-directive interviews using the snowball method.  I 
interviewed heads of the Association Française pour le Dépistage et la Prévention des 
Handicaps de l‟Enfant (AFDPHE, the French association for screening for and preventing 
handicaps in children), the professional association in charge of neonatal screening in France, 
as well as persons in charge of the patients‟ association named “Vaincre la Mucoviscidose” 
(VLM; Winning against cystic fibrosis). The interviews included exchanges with 
representatives in charge of neonatal screening in the relevant funding and political 
authorities: the Caisse Nationale d‟Assurance-Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés (CNAMTS; 
permanent employee health insurance bureau, the public authority that finances France‟s 
universal health insurance program) and the French Ministry of Health. Early on in the survey 
process, I hypothesized that consistent its own public claims, the patient association had 
played a major role in the decision to extend neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis to the 
whole of France; in other words, that its members had acted as subjects of biomedicine.
v
 My 
second hypothesis was that the time dimension and the aim of getting persons with cystic 
fibrosis taken in charge as early as possible in their lives had played a central role in the 
decision. In addition to the knowledge of this domain that I had acquired through the first, 
regional-level field study, I prepared for the interviews by attentively (re)reading 
approximately fifteen national and international biomedical articles on neonatal screening for 
cystic fibrosis; this enabled me to identify potentially controversial points. The interview 
method consisted first of establishing respondents‟ specific occupational or associative 
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itineraries and their interacquaintance network in the area of cystic fibrosis. In the exchange 
that followed respondents were asked to 1) give an account of the history of the decision-
making process and the setting up of the screening program in which they would identify 
what they considered the major stages (important meetings, changes in actors‟ viewpoints, 
etc.); 2) identify the arguments in favor of screening in France, particularly those that had 
been crucial to the decision to generalize screening. Lastly, I was particularly attentive to 
relations and mutual influences among biomedical professionals, non-professional actors, and 
health administration officials. As the work progressed, a number of documents related to 
neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis were made available to me (reports, AFDPHE 
information bulletins, archives, etc.); these constituted supporting material for the interview 
discourse. Interviews lasted on average two hours and were conducted in respondent‟s place 
of work. Respondents‟ names have been omitted here. With respondents‟ consent, all 
interviews were recorded and transcribed in full. 
 
Professional association, patients’ association  
The driving force behind neonatal screening in France was a small group of 
pediatricians and geneticists who in the 1970s were already launching screening for 
phenylketonuria, first on a few newborns, then on the entire neonatal population
vi
. In 1978, 
these professionals, who had united to form the above-cited Association Française pour le 
Dépistage et la Prévention des Handicaps de l‟Enfant (AFDPHE), set about organizing 
neonatal screening and established an agreement with the CNAMTS funding institution. The 
association gradually acquired legitimacy in the eyes of the CNAMTS, who saw it as an 
effective source of assistance in preventing diseases that, though rare, are totally debilitating. 
The arrangement presented the advantage of lowering costs (association leaders worked on a 
volunteer basis), and the professionals could be relied on to set up the program with all the 
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necessary care and rigor. Moreover, the association could claim that it had prevented 
thousands of children from being afflicted with serious handicaps. With its single 
representative within the association, the French ministry of health can be said to have 
accompanied this movement rather than guiding it. When in 2000 the AFDPHE presented its 
case to the CNAMTS for adding cystic fibrosis to the list of diseases screened for, citing 
studies by a group of experts the association had brought together (essentially pediatricians 
and geneticists), the CNAMTS readily agreed to fund the program, for the estimated sum of 
€2m per year. In December 2000 the two partners held a joint press conference to announce 
the launching of the program. At this moment, too, various commissions that included 
different actors (primarily biologists and pediatricians, but also a CNAMTS representative, a 
legal specialist, and others) were set up to work out how best to implement the policy.
vii
 
What may be learned from this brief overview of the way roles and powers were 
initially distributed in this health policy? Studying the way a program of screening for cystic 
fibrosis carriers was set up in Denmark in the 1990s, Koch and Stemerding (1994) proposed 
the term “regime” to designate mutually adapted and coordinated technological, 
organizational and societal practices as a result of earlier processes of attunement between 
technological options, demand and acceptability. In a similar spirit, the already established 
regime of neonatal screening for disease in France facilitated the emergence and acceptability 
of neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis, since it was based on the same types of technical 
organization and social interaction as already existed in France. Furthermore, just as in the 
Danish program the national health policy authority was not the driving force in setting up the 
screening program, so the case of the AFDPHE is indicative of a domain—health—in which, 
historically, a plurality of means have been used to handle medical problems, means often 
furnished by agents other than the state and ranging from benevolent associations to scientific 
societies (Foucault, 1994). Generally, as has been pointed out, the state is more likely to 
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intervene in the administration of bodies in an accompanying role than as an order-giver 
(Fassin & Memmi, 2004), in contrast to its dominating role in other areas, such as security. 
Here the particularity of the AFDPHE resided in the fact that since it was in charge of both 
pushing forward and setting up neonatal screening, it was the single depositary of the sum of 
policies in this field—the result of what was actually a delegation of power.  
While the professional association played a crucial role in setting up generalized 
screening for cystic fibrosis, it must also be understood how screening was apprehended by its 
promoters; that is, how they conceived of this instance of government. Rose (2001) has 
underlined that the major role of professional associations and ethics committees in 
biomedical practices as they concern prenatal diagnosis involves a particular type of “pastoral 
power,” one not oriented toward the population at large but rather targeting individuals “at 
risk.”viii What kind of power is post-natal intervention constructed on, when there can no 
longer be any accusation of eugenics? What kind of relation between power focused on 
individual bodies and a policy meant to cover the population as a whole is such power based 
on? 
The interviews I conducted with members of the AFDPHE working group attest to 
differentiation among biomedical actors by practice (those who followed up on patients/those 
who didn‟t) and evaluation of neonatal screening (seen to involve primarily beneficial 
medical effects/seen more broadly to involve problems, such as informing parents, false 
positives, etc.).
ix
 The first of these positions is attested by the following statement from a 
clinician-pediatrician and active AFDPHE member: “It seems to me that among health 
professionals dealing with cystic fibrosis ... I have no memory of anyone saying, „No, it‟s not 
worth it.‟ ... For my part, I urged them to do it. When I talked to [X, who took the second 
position] about it, I‟d say, “You don‟t know what it is to have people come in with kids age 4, 
5 [that are not being followed]—it shouldn‟t be like that… You start off with a statistics thing, 
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but very soon you‟re dealing with a family.” The second type of position is expressed in the 
following statement from another respondent, also a pediatrician, what the clinicians called a 
“screener”; in other words, someone “who‟s really got the screening mindset”: “The problem 
is that people only talk about medical evaluation, they forget all the rest. Evaluating is not just 
saying that the patient is doing fine or not doing fine or doing a bit better; it also means 
looking at the problems you might have created, the costs, everything there is around that 
action, informing parents, etc. ... in the given population.” The type of medicine argued for 
depended on whether the actor followed patient “cases,” as in one group, or was involved in 
policy technology focused on the population at large. Overall, there were more professionals 
in the first category, and they were clearly more likely to favor screening than the second 
type; this illustrates how preventive policy applied to a population at large can actually be 
based on a case-by-case approach. Even applied to a given population at large—newborns—
generalized screening thus preserved the aspect of pastoral power that emphasizes the 
individual and considers the “flock” as such a secondary concern. This orientation should be 
linked to the history of French medicine, more strongly marked by power focused on the 
individual and the individual‟s body and behavior than on policy techniques covering the 
population at large—in contrast to English medicine, for example (Foucault, 1994). This way 
of conceiving government produced a fragmentation effect which in this case was intensified 
by the role of the patient association, “Vaincre la mucoviscidose”.  
“Vaincre la mucoviscidose” (VLM) was first created in the 1960s on the initiative of 
doctors and a few families under the name Association Française de Lutte Contre la 
Mucoviscidose (French association for combating cystic fibrosis). The association has nearly 
4500 members today, a third of whom are families and adult patients while two-thirds are 
sympathizers. It is organized around a Conseil d‟Administration (CA, administrative board) 
made up primarily of families, patients, and sympathizers, and a Conseil Médical (CM, 
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medical board) together with a Conseil Scientifique (CS, scientific board). The association 
itself was the locus of a subtle power game between professionals and non-professionals. Up 
until the late 1990s, screening for cystic fibrosis was not an association priority, and the CA 
followed the overall negative opinion of the CM in the matter, as it was understood to be the 
best informed and the most competent to judge. While administrators did occasionally make 
decisions which diverged from the opinions of their “expert advisors,” cystic fibrosis 
screening did not seem to them a justifiable priority. But in 1999, when the AFDPHE was 
working on the question of whether screening was advisable and how to implement it, the 
patients‟ association‟s CA was shifting its view: it was now in favor of cystic fibrosis 
screening. Under the influence of one of its new non-medical directors, the administrative 
board saw this as the moment to unite energies within the association and bring cystic fibrosis 
to the attention of the state authorities. Moreover, the idea that gradually germinated was to 
work for improvement in care and follow-up for persons with cystic fibrosis, as may be seen 
from the following statement from this new director who is not the parent of a sick child: “I 
said [to the members of the CA], „I wonder if the setting up of neonatal screening for cystic 
fibrosis might not be a good way for the association to further develop strategically.‟ ... 
[Later] I said; „If we can manage to demonstrate to France and the French that this is a public 
health problem, we can put your disease on stage, as it were ... The second point is that all of 
this only makes sense if it brings improved treatment for you. ... You can influence how 
treatment is organized.‟” As we shall see, this last point can be linked to the thinking of some 
of the professionals. In fact, the convergence of viewpoints among the different actors had 
much to do with the fact that several members of the patient association CM were also 
members of the AFDPHE working group. When the funding authority inquired into the 
patient association‟s opinion of screening, it was able to confirm that it was in favor. In fact, 
this association actively lobbied the public authorities by means of various political officials, 
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positioned either within the ministries or outside; it thus played the role of pressure group, 
with the hired help of a “lobbying office” to more readily open doors. As explained, the health 
ministry of the time was not influential in the decision to screen, but it did become a frontline 
player in reorganizing cystic fibrosis treatment procedures, as we shall see.  
“Vaincre la Mucoviscidose” thus played a mixed role; my initial hypothesis of its 
central role in the decision to generalize neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis was not 
confirmed. One of the members most active in running the association expressed this quite 
clearly:  “It‟s Y [head of the AFDPHE] who deserves the credit for neonatal cystic fibrosis 
screening in France. If Y hadn‟t tackled the problem with such energy and devotion ... I‟d still 
be there [trying to get screening generalized].” The association members had of course acted 
at certain moments as subjects, i.e., they had “acted on others‟ action” (that of the political 
authorities), but often as subjects under medical influence. Association policy on cystic 
fibrosis screening was determined at least as much by the CM as by the non-professionals. It 
would be overestimating the autonomy and role of patient associations to think that the 
example of other diseases such as myopathies (Rabeharisoa & Callon, 1999) applied here. 
Still, the association did manage to elicit the interest of the political authorities, and in this 
sense it did manage to make itself heard. Its influence, though of only relative importance, 
raises the question of the meaning of the political in our societies. The effect of their lobbying 
attests to a political power which once again displaced its center of interest toward individuals 
or groups of individuals (an association) rather than toward the population at large and as 
such.  
This part of the study allowed me to identify the main governing entities, the power 
relations obtaining among them, and the way they conceived of screening. I now had to 
examine the techniques of government.  
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Governing in space and time 
Above and beyond the scientific and medical debate, two arguments were decisive for 
the emergence of consensus in France, a consensus operative within the group of 
professionals set up by the AFDPHE, between the overseeing institutions (CNAMTS, 
ministry of health), and among association leaders.  
First, there was serious concern about the moment in life at which the diagnosis was 
made. The diagnosis was thought to come too late in France though, before implementation of 
neonatal screening, two-thirds of children were diagnosed before the age of one.
x
 Some 
professionals explained that patients diagnosed at the age of six or seven might already have 
undergone serious health damage due to the fact that the disease was not well known enough 
among healthcare givers and the patient had not been adequately followed. This 
understanding was expressed by a pediatrician participating in the AFDPHE working group: 
“Neonatal screening enables us to make an early diagnosis. The fact is that a third of children 
were diagnosed after age one and 15% over age 10. Diagnoses were made extremely late, and 
there were children who arrived with one lung already virtually destroyed.”  
As previously mentioned, one of the striking developments in medicine in the last two 
centuries has been to induce a reconfiguration of the timeframe of disease. Disease used to be 
treated after symptoms appeared; now the idea was to anticipate and prevent. It was no longer 
a matter of waiting for what the future might bring but of transforming the future through new 
behavior in the present (Armstrong, 1995; Foucault, 1994). We should probably go further 
and observe that here the idea was to discover the disease as early as possible: the race against 
disease began at birth. This was consistent with my hypothesis on the importance of the time 
dimension as a vector for diffusion of neonatal screening. It must also be noted that this result 
does not seem to fit into the Foucaldian analytic framework: while that analysis does 
encompass historical processes, Foucault attributed much more importance to space than time 
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in his reading of developments in the second half of the twentieth century.
xi
 Yet as we shall 
see, space-related questions were also clearly relevant.  
Generally speaking, since the emergence of hospital medicine the new medical 
timeframe has gone together with a new spatial one: disease is no longer expressed by 
external symptoms but located in the depths of organs and the substance of tissues 
(Armstrong, 1995; Foucault, 1963). In fact, as my interviews brought out, one major effect of 
neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis was a redistribution in space, one that no longer 
concerned the disease but the patients themselves. The idea that gradually emerged was to 
associate screening with patient follow-up in specialized treatment centers using standardized 
protocols instead of leaving treatment up to doctors who encountered at most a few cases of 
cystic fibrosis in the course of their careers and whose follow-up procedures could only be 
heterogeneous. For half of the persons interviewed, the plan to have patients treated in centers 
that would use a standardized protocol and follow enough patients to confer a specific 
competence on the health care professionals who treat this rare disease was a condition for 
generalizing screening; there was no point to cystic fibrosis screening unless this kind of 
patient follow-up was also guaranteed. As a pediatrician and member of the AFDPHE 
working group explained: “We all agreed that if there was no obligatoin to set up a 
specialized center to manage it—though at the beginning this wasn‟t as clear-cut as it became 
later—it wasn‟t worth doing. Because [otherwise] everyone‟s going to handle things his own 
way in his own little space, and we need coherence.” A CNAMTS official expressed the same 
idea: “The CNAMTS accord specified very clearly that we didn‟t want to set up systematic 
screening without the guarantee of a good treatment and follow-up for the children. That was 
really a condition for setting up the screening.” The other half of my respondents, including a 
majority of AFDPHE working group members, took this reasoning further, to the point where 
they reversed the logical order: in their opinion, screening was a mode for inducing 
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professionals to follow standardized treatment rules, and above all a means of improving 
treatment. It was necessary to remedy practice heterogeneity and dispersion of treatment 
structures; cystic fibrosis screening was the stage that had to be gone through to improve 
patient care quality. A pediatrician and member of the working group explained: “I defended 
the screening program by saying that neonatal screening was a means of handling the problem 
of cystic fibrosis. ... Screening was a means of getting protocole regulated care and follow-up 
established in treatment centers.” Another pediatrician and AFDPHE official specified the 
import of this argument: “It wasn‟t screening for screening‟s sake, with direct or indirect 
arguments ... no. In France this category of patients was not well cared for or followed, and 
this was the occasion to learn it [how to take charge of them]. If we hadn‟t had that I don‟t 
think we would‟ve done it.”  
In 2000-2001, when it was a stated government priority to ensure equal treatment for 
patients throughout the country, the health ministry went beyond what the leaders of the 
AFDPHE were proposing, officially announcing the creation of Centres de Ressources et de 
Compétence de la Mucoviscidose (CRCMs, Cystic fibrosis resource and expertise centers), 
multidisciplinary specialized centers that would fulfill a specific set of functions.
xii
 Better yet, 
the ministry itself funded the centers in two installments of €4.6 million each and ensured the 
creation of permanent jobs in them. Meanwhile the new directors of the CRCMs organized 
themselves into the “Fédération des CRCM,” later the Société Française de la Mucoviscidose. 
As an administrative structure and scientific society, this association was the guarantor of a 
certain scientific and medical legitimacy. Screening thus came to mean acting to improve 
patients‟ health and well-being by means of a biomedical technique; the effect was to 
structure the way patient treatment was organized, centralize that treatment, receive funds, 
and ensure legitimacy.  
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It may rightly be observed that screening for a genetic disease made the patient 
population more captive than it had been: biomedical technique was now being used to 
manage patient populations. The fact that neonatal cystic fibrosis screening in France was 
therefore also in part an instrument for orienting patients in space should not surprise us if we 
remember that medicine has historically been an art of spatial distribution, requiring the 
resolution of such questions as hospital location, cemetery displacement, separation of 
patients likely to contaminate each other, etc. (Foucault, 1994). This approach of course has 
political implications in terms of power. As Foucault (1994) pointed out, “When it becomes 
possible to analyze knowledge in terms of region, area, implantation, displacement, transfer, 
we can grasp the process by which knowledge functions as power and reactivates the effects 
of power”. It would be a gross exaggeration and hardly to our purposes to reduce this health 
policy to a power strategy on the part of the professionals. It could not be called a deliberate, 
preconceived strategy, but rather a technique for guiding and “framing” professionals and 
orienting patients, a technique invented during the process. In fact, the regional cystic fibrosis 
screening program in Brittany had already made use of this argument, among many others, in 
the late 1980s (anonymous reference for referees). However, the screening policy did indeed 
have power effects, in the form of an increased cohort of patients followed in the centers, 
funding and jobs allocated to those centers, the new visibility of the disease, etc. The 
hypothesis has been put forward that cystic fibrosis screening gave rise to national decisions 
that strengthened the dynamic in favor of a “sub-specialization in cystic fibrosis” within the 
pediatric specialization process (Frattini & Naiditch, 2004). My results show that above and 
beyond any professional dynamic, what was invented was an art of governing. The history of 
cystic fibrosis screening retraces the genesis of a technique applied both to one‟s own 
conduct, in that a medical collective was enjoined to follow protocols, and the conduct of 
others, i.e., cystic fibrosis patient families, who were now led to bring their children to 
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specialized centers. Compared to the classic meaning of the word government, however, 
government of “oneself” here pertains to a collective “self”: rather than an inquiry into one‟s 
own individual behavior, the aim was to affect practices within the medical collective one 
belonged to.  
 
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion three remarks. The first concerns the impact of genetics, the 
second the analytics of government, and the third, a specific implication of government. 
Between a fantasy of genetics as a force that is transforming altogether our way of 
conceiving of life, our human capacities, handicaps, social problems, family relations, and 
quality of life, and an understanding that denies any impact at all to genetics, Richards (2001) 
has proposed a nuanced analysis that points up the consequences of genetics as they derive 
directly from practices. With regard specifically to cystic fibrosis, Kerr (2005), after 
presenting the different techniques and ideas that shaped our conception of this disease from 
the 1940s to the present, argued against the claim that genetics has radically modified that 
conception. This raises the question of what genetics has changed or is changing in health 
policy on cystic fibrosis. My earlier work brought to light that the genetics approach of 
looking for mutations helped make neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis acceptable in France 
because it was used in such a way as to increase the specificity of tests and limit the number 
of parents unnecessarily made to worry about their children‟s health (author‟s reference). 
Screening has here in turn been analyzed as a governing technique. Genetics indirectly played 
a role in the emergence of a mode of government based on a biomedical technique. It worked 
to legitimate a health policy that centralized treatment and had power effects. 
The history of how screening was set up in France shows the decisive role of 
professionals as full-fledged acting subjects. The patient association intervened more 
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peripherally and had no decision-making function, though its intervention was real; it 
functioned as a pressure group. It is also necessary to specify what is meant by “patient” 
association given that close study of who was actually implicated in the association reveals 
that the role played by the its medical advisors was at least as important as that of the non-
professionals. These two sets of persons established relations of mutual influence, 
strengthened by the fact of double professional membership, a situation which in turn created 
a relatively limited network of experts. It is important that the general image created by these 
influences and the existence of this network not be one of a flattened, non-hierarchically 
organized social micro-world with everyone at the same level; that would be to compress the 
thickness of power relations in an analytic approach to government that would look only for 
relations between free subjects. On the other hand, this analytics allows us to reposition 
distinctions between the governing and the governed within their own specific dynamic (some 
groups may be in control at certain moments, then lose that control) and to study how the 
different types of subjects were constituted differently (the professional association to which 
power was delegated and the pressure group are each endowed with a specific type of power).   
One of the ways I will further develop this research is by studying what local 
procedures come into play in the transmission of government all the way to the level of 
maternity wards. Before newborns are screened in France, parents are asked for their consent, 
and at least in legal terms, they have a certain degree of maneuvering room. As Fassin (2000) 
proposes in a text on the politics and policies of living beings and life, the point is to “study 
health as both a signified and a signifyer of social change; that is, for the meanings it bears 
and the signs its manifests of those meanings.” In a screening policy that appears in some 
respects quite consensual—it is, after all, a matter of treating suffering children—one of the 
issues would seem to be the form taken by the political. It is important to be clear about the 
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ways that conceptions of the individual and the collective, power relations, types of 
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i In this connection we may quote Gilbert (1992), winner of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry whose work led to 
determining DNA sequences: “Three billion bases of sequences can be put on a single compact disk (CD), and 
one will be able to pull a CD out of one‟s pocket and say, „Here is a human being; it‟s me!‟” 
ii Cystic fibrosis is usually characterized by severe respiratory and digestive disorders due to the accumulation of 
viscous mucus, though the severity of these disorders varies greatly and their occurence is unpredictable. Life 
expectancy in France for a person with cystic fibrosis is approximately 37 years. 
iii Today, a good many states in the US practice neonatal cystic fibrosis screening (NNSGRC, 2006) and Great 
Britain plans to generalize it in 2007. For information on the British program, see in particular the site of the 
Institute of Child Health: www.ich.ucl.ac.uk/. 
iv Pointing out that human beings can do this does not mean that they do do it, especially given the generalized 
prohibition against human transgenesis that may be transmitted to descendants. Though genetic therapy clinical 
trials that introduce genes into patients‟ chromosomes that are not transmitted to descendants raise a series of 
conceptual and technical difficulties (Stockdale, 1999), these trials do attest to humans‟ability to modify 
themselves genetically as living beings. 
v The association‟s annual report for 1999 specified: “In full agreement with the AFDPHE, the AFLM [former 
association acronym] is presently engaged in all necessary procedures and lobbying of the CNAMTS and the 
Health Ministry bureau [in order to participate in organizing neonatal screening for cystic fibrosis]” (VLM, 
1999).  
vi Phenylketonuria screening stands as a highly successful example of neonatal screening: newborns with the 
disease are immediately given appropriate nutrition, thereby preventing otherwise unavoidable mental 
retardation. 
vii AFDPHE archives show that the procedure for detecting mutations was developed by one of these 
commissions. Using a study of mutation distribution in France‟s various regions, the commission first tested a 
variety of detection kits available on the market, ultimately choosing to recommend one that recognizes 20 
mutations and covers 82% of mutations found in France. It also requested the provider to find a means of 
extending the capacities of the kit to 10 additional mutations, including one known as “African,” detected 
primarily in black populations. It therefore did not restrict representation of the disease to its “Caucasian” 
varieties, though whitesare much more likely to have the disease. 
viii The metaphor of pastoral power is Foucault‟s. It designates a type of power oriented both toward the flock as 
a whole and each animal of which it is composed. 
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ix In this sense, the AFDPHE debates were similar to those noted for other screening programs; e.g., 
mammography, characterized by tension between the orientations of epidemiologists, who were concerned about 
the various problems raised by the procedure (cost, women‟s anxiety, etc.), and clinicians, concerned not to let 
any cancer cases go undetected (Kaufert, 2000).  
x Information from the “Rapport sur la situation de la mucoviscidose en France en 2000,” published by the 
Observatoire National de la Mucoviscidose, ONM (2002). 
xi In a text written in 1967 that he consented to have published in 1984, Foucault (1994) wrote: “I think the focus 
of worry at this time is probably more fundamentally related to space than time.” 
xii Government decree (circulaire) DHOS-DGS no. 502 of October 22, 2001. 
